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Casenote
Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Monterey
Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist.:
The California Supreme Court Gives a
Green Light to Local Toxic Air Emission
Control Programs
Prior to 1983, regional and county air pollution control districts
(districts)' were at liberty to regulate nonvehicular or stationary2
sources of air pollution according to the specific needs of the com-
munities they served.3 Because of the districts' regulatory independ-
1. See CAL. HEALT & SAFTY CODE § 39025 (West 1986) ("District" includes air
pollution control districts and air quality management districts). The boundaries of single-
county Districts are prescribed by county limits. Id. § 40150 (West 1986). Two, or more,
individual Districts may merge into a "unified district." Id. The Monterey Bay Unified Air
Pollution Control District, consisting of Santa Cruz, San Benito, and Monterey Counties, is
an example of a unified district. See Note, Stationary Source Air Pollution Control in
California: A Proposed Jurisdictional Reorganization, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 893, 900 n.33
(1979) [hereinafter A Proposed Jurisdictional Reorganization]. See also infra notes 19-33 and
accompanying text (discussing the structure of the county air pollution control district).
2. Nonvehicular source means any source of air pollution other than from motor vehicles.
CAL. HEAL & SAFETY CODE § 39043 (West 1986).
3. See infra notes 22-33 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory authority of the
air pollution control districts). However, the regulatory authority of districts is subject to
minimum standards established by the State Air Resources Board and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) under the Federal Clean Air Act. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1857 c-4
(1987) (Federal Clean Air Act); A Proposed Jurisdictional Reorganization, supra note 1, at
896-98 (discussing the development of federal legislation relating to the control of air pollution);
id. at 898 n.19 (discussing the authority of federal EPA in the regulation of state air pollution
control activities). See also infra notes 35-45 and accompanying text (discussing the function
and responsibility of the State Air Resources Board).
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ence, the degree of air pollution regulation within neighboring counties
might vary widely. 4 The Tanner Act (Tanner),5 enacted in 1983,
provides a statewide program designed to promote minimum air
quality control standards throughout California.6 Under Tanner, the
State Air Resources Board (ARB)7 studies potentially toxic air pol-
lutants to determine whether they require regulation.' For each pol-
lutant identified as a toxic air contaminant (TAG), the ARB formulates
a series of control measures applicable to specific nonvehicular sources
of the TAC. 9 Districts are required to adopt regulations which are
at least as stringent as the control measures promulgated by the
ARB.10
The procedures mandated under Tanner do not address whether
districts retain authority to identify toxic substances independent of
the ARB. 11 In Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Monterey Bay Unified
Air Pollution Control Dist.,12 the California Supreme Court recog-
nized the authority of county and regional districts to regulate all
nonvehicular sources of air pollution.13 The court held that the
legislature, in enacting Tanner, did not intend to repeal the preexisting
regulatory authority of the districts. 14 Reversing the court of appeals,
the supreme court determined that the legislature intended the ARB,
acting under Tanner, to assist the districts in the identification of
TAC's in order to improve air pollution regulation rather than to
"eviscerate" the existing regulatory structure. 5
4. See infra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the regulatory difficulties resulting
from individual district authority).
5. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 39650-39674 (West 1986) (enacted by 1983 Cal. Stat.
ch. 1047, § 1) (Tanner Act as enacted).
6. Id. § 39650(k) (statewide program necessary to provide technical and scientific assis-
tance to districts and minimize inconsistencies in protecting public health).
7. See id. § 39510 (vest 1986) (providing for the State Air Resources Board). The ARB
is a nine member panel appointed by the Governor. Id. See also id. §§ 39003, 41500 (West
1986 & Supp. 1989) (ARB's mandate includes researching sources of air pollution and
coordinating local and regional efforts to achieve state and federal ambient air quality
standards).
8. See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text (discussing the toxic air contaminant
identification program).
9. See infra note 49 (defining toxic air contaminant).
10. CAL. HEALTH & SArTY CODE § 39666(d) (districts must adopt regulations within six
months of the ARB's determination that a substance is a toxic air contaminant).
11. See western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist.,
202 Cal. App. 3d 511, 513, 248 Cal. Rptr. 418, 419 (1988) (grappling with the effect of the
Tanner Act on district statutory authority). The court of appeal held that the Tanner Act
preempted the District's authority to identify toxic air contaminants until identified by the
Board as a toxic air contaminant. Id. at 522, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
12. 49 Cal. 3d 408, 777 P.2d 157, 261 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1989).
13. Id. at 411, 777 P.2d at 158, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 412, 777 P.2d at 158, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
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Part I of this Note discusses the structure and authority of districts
prior to Tanner, the mechanics and legislative intent of Tanner, and
the pollution control regulation in Monterey Bay creating the dis-
pute. 16 Part II discusses the facts of Monterey Bay and reviews the
analysis and decision of the California Supreme Court.' 7 Part III
discusses the legal ramifications of Monterey Bay. 8
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Nonvehicular Air Pollution Regulation in California Prior to
the Tanner Act
County air pollution control districts were the first legislatively
created agencies specifically responsible for regulating nonvehicular
sources of air pollution. 9 Each county is required to establish an air
pollution control district (district), unless the county falls within one
of several statutorily designated regions.20 The structure of a district
mirrors the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the United
States government.
2'
The rule-making body, called the air pollution control board
(Board), is composed of the members of the county board of super-
visors acting ex-officio. The Board enacts regulations necessary or
proper to enforce state, federal, or local air quality standards. 23
Public notice and hearing is required for any action enacting, amend-
ing, or repealing a district regulation. 24 Additionally, the Board may
16. See infra notes 19-82 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 83-156 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 157-168 and accompanying text.
19. See Simmons, A Many Layered Wonder: Nonvehicular Air Pollution Control Law in
California, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 109, 115 (1974) [hereinafter A Many Layered Wonder] (as
common law nuisance became inadequate to manage growing air pollution problems, a statutory
remedy was required).
20. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40002 (West 1986) (each district required to provide
pollution control unless located within the Bay District, South Coast District, regional district
or unified district). See id. § 39015 (Vest 1986) (definition of Bay District); id. § 39052.5
(West 1986) (definition of South Coast District); id. § 39049 (West 1986) (definition of regional
district); id. § 39056 (West 1986) (definition of unified district).
21. See A Many Layered Wonder, supra note 19, at 115 (discussing the structure of
county air pollution control districts).
22. CAL. HEaLTH & SAETY CODE § 40100 (West 1986).
23. Id. § 40001 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989).
24. Id. § 40725(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1989) (hearings must be preceded by 30 day public
notice).
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issue orders of abatement for violations of federal, state, or local
air emission standards. 21
The executive function of the district is carried out by the air
pollution control officer (Officer), who implements and enforces the
regulations adopted by the Board.26 The regulations adopted by the
Board are imposed upon nonvehicular sources of air pollution by
means of a permit system which is administered by the Officer. 27
Under the district's permit system, the owner or operator of a facility
which emits a regulated air pollutant must apply for, and receive, a
permit to operate. 2 If the Officer is satisfied that a facility complies
with district pollution control regulations, a permit will be issued.
29
Attendant to the responsibility of issuing permits, the Officer con-
ducts on-site inspections of air pollution sources to ensure continuing
compliance. 0
The hearing board serves as the judicial branch of the air pollution
control district. Members of the hearing board, who are appointed
by the Board, include an attorney, an engineer, a doctor, and two
lay persons."' The hearing board's responsibilities include hearing
petitions for variances from state or district regulations and reviewing
the enforcement activities conducted by the air pollution control
officer.3 2 When authorized by the Board, the hearing board may
25. Id. § 42450 (West Supp. 1989) (requiring district air pollution control boards to
provide 30 day notice and hearing on the matter before issuing an order of abatement). See
id. § 42452 (order for abatement issued in the form of an injunction requiring the violator to
refrain from a specified act); id. § 42453 (district may seek an injunctive order from superior
court against a person violating an order for abatement).
26. Id. § 40752 (West 1986) (authority of air pollution control officer).
27. Applicants seeking to build, alter, replace or operate equipment which may emit air
pollutants must apply for, and receive, a permit from the district. Id. § 42300 (West 1986).
See id. § 39013 (vest 1986) (air pollutant means a release into the atmosphere of any noxious
substance).
28. Id. § 42300 (West 1986). In the application, source operators must furnish the Officer
with any data relating to current emissions of regulated substances. Facilities seeking to increase
emissions of regulated substances are required to apply for a new permit. Id. § 42303 (West
1986).
29. Id. §§ 42300, 42301(b) (West 1986).
30. Id. §§ 41510, 42707 (West 1986).
31. Id. § 40801 (West 1986). Board members must have the following qualifications: (1)
A lawyer admitted to the California Bar, (2) an engineer registered under the Professional
Engineers Act, (3) a member of the medical profession, having specialized skill in the fields
of environmental medicine, community medicine, occupational medicine, or toxicologic medi-
cine, and (4) two members of the public. Id. In the event that a hearing board position cannot
be filled with a qualified person from within the district, the air pollution control board may
appoint any ready or able person. Id. § 40802 (West 1986).
32. The review function includes the authority to issue, revoke, or reinstate permits
granted or suspended by the air pollution control officer. Id. § 42309 (West 1986). See generally
Manaster, Administration of Air Pollution Disputes: The Work of the Air Pollution Control
Hearing Boards in California, 17 U.C. DAVIs L. R-v. 1117 (1984).
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issue orders for abatement. 33
The independent authority of county air pollution control districts
caused practical difficulties in statewide efforts to control air quality.
Differing political and economic climates within individual districts
contributed to corresponding differences in the degree of air pollution
regulation between districts. 34 The legislature's first effort to establish
uniform minimum air pollution control among the districts was the
creation of the ARB.3 - In providing for the ARB, the legislature
emphasized the need for a single agency responsible for coordinating
air conservation activities within the state.3 6 Initially, the ARB was
33. See CA. HEALTH & SArETY CODE § 42451 (West 1986) (hearing board's authority to
issue order for abatement subject to public notice and hearing requirements).
34. Economic and political pressures may influence the degree of regulation within a
county district. The air pollution control board is composed of the members of the county
board of supervisors who are politically sensitive to a relatively small community. In regions
that benefit substantially from tourism, political pressure may produce resistance to smokestack
industries operating, or seeking to operate, within that county. However, air pollution is not
a local problem. If economic pressures, as explained below, tend to produce the lowest possible
regulatory standards in one county, every county down wind suffers.
Assume that a county does not benefit from tourism, but does provide a haven for smokestack
industry. Its development depends on taxes and employment resulting from those industries.
In a sparsely populated county, industry might employ a significant number of voters. In the
case of smokestack industries, economic welfare is inversely related to the degree of air
pollution regulation. Hence, to the extent that an employee's perceived welfare is contingent
on that of the industry, political leverage, when brought to bear, will seek to reduce or fix
pollution regulation. If the most politically influential industries are also the largest polluters,
the substances most in need of control may be minimally regulated. The result, from a
statewide perspective, is that polluters will tend to concentrate in areas having the least
regulation and total air pollution regulation will remain at the lowest possible standard.
Air pollution emitted in one county effects surrounding counties as much, or more, than it
effects the source region. If one district chooses to minimize air pollution regulation in order
to promote its economy, the ill effects resulting from increased emissions will affect counties
downwind. The negative environmental effect on neighboring counties downwind is com-
pounded by a revenue drain as polluters move to districts requiring less regulation. A loss of
business, in the surrounding counties provides incentive for them to reduce regulation corre-
spondingly. As for the source region, the economic cost of any increase in air pollution
standards would be borne internally, while any benefits would accrue downwind. For the
system as a whole, a stable equilibrium is achieved at the lowest possible levels of regulation.
See generally A Proposed Reorganization, supra note 1, at 908-913 (discussing the ineffective-
ness of local air pollution control structure).
Water pollution regulation presents a similar regulatory problem, however, the administrative
structure is better suited for the job. The state is divided into nine regions, each headed by a
regional board. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13200, 13201 (West 1971). The Governor appoints
members of the regional boards. There are strict rules prohibiting conflicts of interest. Id. §§
13201, 13207 (vest 1971 & Supp. 1989) (no member may be employed in any manner b y a
"waste discharger"). The nine regional boards are headed by a State Board, acting much like
the ARB, responsible for implementing federal water pollution legislation and creating state
water policy. See id. §§ 13140, 13160 (vest Supp. 1989).
35. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39510 (West 1986) (composition and required quali-
fications for members of the Air Resources Board). See A Many Layered Wonder, supra note
19, at 115 (discussing the legislative history of county air pollution control districts).
36. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 39003, 39500 (West 1986) (ARB charged with
the responsibility of coordinating efforts to achieve and maintain ambient air quality standards).
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authorized to regulate vehicular air pollution,37 establish air basins, 8
set ambient air quality standards, 39 and conduct research programs.40
However, primary responsibility for regulating nonvehicular air pol-
lution sources was left to the districts.
41
Although the ARB does not directly regulate nonvehicular air
pollution sources, it is authorized to supervise certain district regu-
latory activities. Districts must enact regulations reasonably calculated
to meet the ambient air quality standards established by the ARB.
42
The ARB reviews regulations enacted, amended, or repealed by
district Boards to ensure that ambient air quality standards will
continue to be met.43 If the ARB finds that a district's regulations
are insufficient, the ARB is authorized to step in and directly regulate
nonvehicular air pollution sources within the district's jurisdiction.4
The ARB also reviews variances granted by a district hearing board
and may revoke or modify the variance according to its findings.45
With the enactment of the Tanner Act, the legislature provided
the ARB with the additional responsibility of identifying toxic air
contaminants. 46 Traditionally, the districts determined what subst-
ances warranted regulation when standards were not specified by
state or federal law.47 The Tanner Act was enacted to clarify the
ARB's authority relative to the districts; however, the new program
left many questions unanswered. 48
37. See id. § 39500 (West 1986) (authority to regulate motor vehicle emissions); id. §
39060 (West 1986) (definition of vehicular sources).
38. Id. § 39606(a) (West 1986) (ARB authority to establish air basins and set ambient air
quality standards). See id. § 39012 (West 1986) (definition of air basin).
39. Id. § 39606(b) (vest 1986) (standards may vary from one air basin to another).
Ambient air quality standards are specified concentrations and durations of air pollutants
established by the ARB. Id. § 39014 (,vest 1986) (defining ambient air quality standards).
40. Id. § 39701 (West 1986). Required research areas include: vehicular emission controls,
alternative fuels, nonvehicular emissions controls, control of specific contaminants, and alter-
natives to agricultural burning. Id.
41. Id. § 40000 (West 1986) (statement of legislative intent allocating authority of districts
and the ARB).
42. Id. § 40001 (vest 1986).
43. The ARB must review district enforcement practices to ensure that reasonable provision
is made to promote state air quality standards. Id. § 41500(c) (West 1986).
44. Id. § 41505 (vest 1986).
45. Id. § 42362 (Vest 1986) (authority of the ARB to modify variance).
46. See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text (discussing the Tanner Act's toxic air
contaminant identification procedures).
47. CAL. HEALrH & SAFETY CoDE. §§ 40001, 40702 (West 1986) (district authority to
adopt rules and regulations deemed necessary or proper to regulate nonvehicular air pollution
sources).
48. Id. § 39650(0 (West 1986) (statement of legislative intent expressing a need to clarify
the ARB's authority with respect to the identification of toxic air pollutants).
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B. The Tanner Act of 1983
Under the Tanner Act (Tanner), the ARB administers a two prong
procedure. The first stage is designed to identify substances that
qualify as toxic air contaminants (TAC's).4 9 In the second stage, the
ARB considers the degree of control necessary to render a TAC safe
and adopts an airborne toxic control measure (ATCM), which serves
as a minimum standard for district regulation of the substance.
5 0
Tanner provides liberal opportunity for public comment and intera-
gency review, and establishes checks for scientific integrity.
1. Identification of Toxic Air Contaminants
The ARB initiates the identification process by requesting the State
Department of Health Services (Health Services) to evaluate a sub-
stance and prepare a recommendation regarding its toxicity.5 1 Health
Services collects all available scientific data 2 on the substance and
prepares an estimate of the minimum level of exposure likely to
produce harmful health effects in humans.13 Based on this report
from Health Services, the ARB prepares a preliminary report con-
taining findings sufficient to serve as a basis for regulatory action. 4
The supporting data and scientific method employed in producing
the report is reviewed by a Scientific Review Panel to ensure integ-
rity.
55
49. See id. § 39655 (definition of toxic air contaminant). A toxic air contaminant is
defined as an airborne substance which may cause or contribute to an increase in mortality
rate, the rate of serious illness, or which poses a present or potential threat to human health.
Id. Substances identified under the Federal Clean Air Act as hazardous air pollutants must be
designated as toxic air contaminants by the ARB. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1987) (federal
criterion for the identification of hazardous air pollutants).
50. See CAL. HEasi & SAFErY CODE §§ 39660-62 (procedure for identification of toxic
air contaminants); 39665, 39666 (procedure and other requirements for developing airborne
toxic control measures). See also id. § 39656 (definition of airborne toxic control measure).
An air toxic control measure (ATCM) is a recommended method of reducing emissions of
toxic air contaminants. Id.
51. Id. § 39660(a).
52. The Tanner Act provides that the protection of public health mandates the identifi-
cation and control of toxic air contaminants by means of the best available scientific evidence.
Id. § 39650(d).
53. Id. § 39660(c) (if no threshold level is determinable, Health Services must assess the
potential range of risk to human health resulting from estimated levels of exposure). Health
Services must complete and return the report to the ARB within 120 days. Id. § 39660(d).
54. Id. § 39661(a).
55. Id. §§ 39661(b) (the nine member panel must formally review scientific procedures
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If the preliminary report passes the Scientific Review Panel's
inspection and the ARB considers the substance a TAC, the ARB
lists the substance in a proposed regulation. 6 After a public hearing
on the ARB's proposed regulation, substances identified as TAC's
are listed in a formal regulation. 7 For each TAC included in the
regulation, the ARB must establish an exposure level below which
no adverse health effect is anticipated .5  The ARB has completed the
identification process for only nine substances since Tanner was
enacted in 1983.19
2. Adoption of Airborne Toxic Control Measures
Once the identification process is completed, the second phase of
Tanner is triggered. The ARB prepares a report specifying the degree
of regulation necessary for effective control of each identified TAC.60
Based upon all available data for each TAC, the ARB's report must
specify present and expected future emissions rates, chemical stability
within the atmosphere, potential sources, feasibility of effective con-
trol, health and environmental risks, and available control technol-
ogies along with their associated costs. 6' After another public hearing,
the ARB adopts a series of ATCM's designed to reduce emissions
of the TAC from potential nonvehicular sources. 62 Within six months
of the ARB's adoption of an ATCM, the districts must adopt their
own regulations for each TAC, which must be at least as stringent
as the ATCM. 63
and methods supporting the data and the resulting conclusions); 39661(c) (if the panel finds
the report seriously deficient, it is returned to the ARB for revision). See id. § 39670(b)
(members of the scientific review panel must be highly qualified and active in scientific
research). The Scientific Review Panel has rejected at least two of the health effects reports
submitted by the ARB. Brief for Respondent at I1 n.8, Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Monterey
Bay Air Quality Management Dist., 49 Cal. 3d 408, 777 P.2d 157, 261 Cal. Rptr. 384 (No.
S006708) (1989).
56. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39662(a).
57. Id. See id. § 39662(b) (public hearing requirement).
58. Id. § 39662(c).
59. See Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist.,
49 Cal. 3d 408, 414 n.8, 777 P.2d 157, 160 n.8, 261 Cal. Rptr. 384, 387 n.8 (1989). The nine
identified substances are asbestos, benzene, cadmium, carbon tetrachloride, chlorinated dioxins
and dibenzofurans, chromium (VI), ethylene dibromide, and ethylene oxide. Id. All nine
substances were included on the list attached to Rule 1000 when it was enacted. Id.
60. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39665(a). In preparing the report, the ARB consults
with districts, affected sources, and the interested public. Id.
61. See id. § 39665(b) (findings to be included in report if reasonably available).
62. Id. § 39666(a).
63. Id. § 39666(d).
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To date, the ARB has not produced a single ATCM. 4 As a result,
the districts have been left without the minimum toxic air pollution
control standards contemplated under Tanner. In order to fill this
regulatory void, Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control District
(District) created its own toxic air contaminant identification and
control program, Rule 1000.6
C. Monterey Bay's Interim Solution - Rule 1000
Like Tanner, Rule 1000 establishes a two prong procedure for the
identification and subsequent regulation of toxic air contaminants.
Under Rule 1000, the identification process is administered by the
Officer,6s who conducts a study of substances considered potentially
toxic by the state.67 The Officer draws candidate substances from a
list of toxic substances regulated in the workplace. 68 As a result of
the study, the Officer determines whether a substance qualifies as
either a toxic air contaminant 69 or a carcinogenic toxic air contami-
nant (CTAC).70 To aid in the determination, the Officer consults
with the ARB, Department of Health Services, and the International
Agency for Research on Cancer Monographs.
7
1
Unlike Tanner's complicated procedure for the development of
emission control measures, Rule 1000 simply directs the Officer to
require generally specified control measures. 72 Facilities emitting toxic
air contaminants at a rate exceeding some "threshold value" must
64. western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist., 202
Cal. App. 3d 511, 516, 248 Cal. Rptr. 418, 421 (1988).
65. See Monterey Bay, 49 Cal. 3d at 418 n.14, 777 P.2d at 163 n.14, 261 Cal. Rptr. at
390 n.14. Rule 1000 was the first district regulation enacted after the Tanner Act which
provided for the identification and control of toxic air contaminants. Id.
66. See CAL. HEATH & SAFhTY CODE § 40750 (West 1986) (providing district authority
to appoint air pollution control officer).
67. Rule 1000 §§ 3.2, 3.9 (1986) (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journa).
68. Id. § 3.9.1 (list of hazardous substances to be regulated in the workplace as codified
in 8 CAL. CODE. REGs. § 5155(a) (West 1989).
69. A toxic air contaminant is a substance which may cause or contribute to an increase
in mortality, morbidity, or may otherwise pose a material impairment to human health. Id. §
3.9.1.
70. A CTAC is a toxic air contaminant which the Officer determines causes cancer in
humans. Id. § 3.2. See id. §§ 3.2.1-3.2.3 (guidelines and presumptions governing the Officer's
procedure for the identification of CTAC's).
71. Id. § 3.2.3 (the Officer's consultations appear to be informal with no established
guidelines).
72. See infra notes 73-79, and accompanying text (describing Rule 1000's applicable
control measures).
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use reasonable control technology to reduce emissions. 73 Facilities
which emit CTAC's are required to use the best control technology
available which has been successfully used. 74 As a lower regulatory
threshold, all air pollution control measures approved by the Officer
must be at least as stringent as measures required by other federal,
state or district laws.
75
Control measures apply to new or modified stationary air pollution
sources emitting substances identified as toxic air contaminants or
CTAC's. 76 The required control measures are imposed by means of
a permit system.7 7 A facility undergoing expansion, which may in-
crease air emissions of substances identified as toxic air contaminants
or CTAC's, must satisfy the Officer that necessary control measures
have been implemented. 78 Permit applicants must prepare a pollutant
status report detailing proposed changes in the emission rate of
regulated air pollutants, alternative processes, substitute compounds,
and other procedures which may be available to protect the public
health.
79
In contrast to Tanner's ATCM procedure, which failed to produce
a single control measure over a six year period, Rule 1000's procedure
proved to be easily managed. Prior to the enactment of Rule 1000,
but pursuant to its directive, the Officer identified 125 substances as
toxic air contaminants and 23 substances as CTAC's. 0 A list of these
substances was attached to Rule 1000 when it was formally adopted
by the District's Board.8' However, because Rule 1000 duplicated the
functions of Tanner, the supreme court had to determine whether
the legislature, in enacting Tanner, intended to preclude individual
district regulation of potentially toxic substances. 2
73. Reasonable control technology means pollution controls readily available and com-
monly used. Rule 1000 § 3.7.1.
74. Best control technology means the most effective control measures successfully used
which the Officer determines to be cost effective. Id. § 3.1.1.
75. Id. § 3.1.2.
76. Id. § 1.2.1. See id. § 4.1.1 (toxic air contaminant control measure applicable to
noncarcinogenic toxic air pollutants).
77. Id. § 4.1.3. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text (standards and regulations
comprising a district's permit procedures are established by the air pollution control board).
78. Rule 1000 §§ 4.1.1, 4.4.1.
79. Id. § 3.6.
80. See Monterey Bay, 49 Cal. 3d at 415, 777 P.2d at 161, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 417, 777 P.2d at 162, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
1990 / Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Monterey Bay
II. THE CASE
A. The Facts
Western States Petroleum Association (WSPA), a trade association
representing various oil refining interests, filed suit in California
Superior Court seeking declaratory relief invalidating Rule 1000.83
WSPA challenged Rule 1000 on two grounds. Their primary argument
was that Rule 1000 frustrated the legislative goals expressed in
Tanner. 4 WSPA noted that the purpose of Tanner was to provide
uniform air pollution regulations across the state and to identify
toxic air contaminants by means of the best available scientific
evidence." Since independent district regulation would promote reg-
ulatory inconsistencies across the state and ad hoc identification
schemes would almost certainly not utilize the best available scientific
evidence, WSPA argued that the legislature must have intended to
preclude continued district regulation.
6
WSPA's second argument against the validity of Rule 1000 attacked
the delegation of rule-making authority to the Officer.8 7 Under Rule
1000, the Officer exercises some discretion in the toxic air contami-
nant identification procedure. 8 The Officer's determination that a
substance qualifies as a toxic air contaminant triggers Rule 1000's
control measure requirements.8 9 WSPA contended that the power to
83. Id. 49 Cal. 3d at 416, 777 P.2d at 161, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
84. Id.
85. Id. Respondent's argument concerning the need for the "best scientific evidence" in
the identification and control of toxic air contaminants, is illustrated by the recent switch from
lead to benzene as an octane booster in gasoline. Brief for Respondent at 24, Western Oil &
Gas Ass'n v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist., 49 Cal. 3d 408, 777 P.2d
157, 261 Cal. Rptr. 388 (No. S006708) (1989). The substitution resulted from EPA and ARB
restrictions on the use of lead. Id. Benzene, however, has been identified as a TAC. Id. Since
both substances are extremely toxic the benefit from the substitution is unclear, while the
immediate economic cost is substantial. Id. Regulations imposed by districts, without the
resources to conduct comprehensive studies of potential alternatives might likewise, impose
burdensome regulations without gaining anything other than a perceived benefit. Id.
86. See Monterey Bay, 49 Cal. 3d at 416, 777 P.2d at 161, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 388. See
also Brief for Respondent at 17, Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Monterey Bay Unified Air
Pollution Control Dist., 49 Cal. 3d 408, 777 P.2d 157, 261 Cal. Rptr. 388 (No. S006708)
(1989) (discussing WSPA's interpretation of Tanner).
87. See Monterey Bay, 49 Cal. 3d at 412, 777 P.2d at 161, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 388 (1989).
88. Id.
89. See id. at 427, 777 P.2d at 168, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
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exercise discretion was an exercise of rule-making authority. 9 Existing
law requires the exercise of rule-making authority, if delegated, to
be accompanied by a public notice and hearing. 91 WSPA argued that
because Rule 1000 makes no such provision, the delegation was
improper. 92
At the trial level, the parties filed cross motions for summary
judgment and the court entered judgment in favor of the District. 93
In reversing the trial court, the court of appeal focused upon whether
the legislature, in enacting Tanner, intended to preempt a district's
authority to independently identify and control toxic air contami-
nants. 94
Since nothing in Tanner expressly preempted district authority, the
court of appeal turned to an implied preemption analysis. 9 The test
for implied preemption was whether local legislation had entered an
area so completely occupied by general law that the matter had
become exclusively a state concern. 96 As construed by the court of
appeal, the central purpose of Tanner was to provide for the utili-
zation of the best available scientific evidence in the identification
of toxic air contaminants. 97 This statement of legislative intent was
supported by Tanner's comprehensive and detailed identification
procedures designed to ensure careful study and scientific integrity. 98
Continued independent district identification and regulation of toxic
90. Brief for Respondent at 25, Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Monterey Bay Unified Air
Pollution Control Dist., 49 Cal. 3d 408, 777 P.2d 157, 261 Cal. Rptr. 388 (No. S006708)
(1989).
91. See CAL. HExAH & SaY CODE §§ 40725-28 (,Vest Supp. 1989) (public notice and
hearing requirements necessary for the adoption of rules for general application).
92. See Monterey Bay, 49 Cal. 3d at 427, 777 P.2d at 168, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
93. Id. at 416, 777 P.2d at 161, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
94. Id. See Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control
Dist., 202 Cal. App. 3d 511, 516, 248 Cal. Rptr. 418, 423 (1988).
95. Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist., 202
Cal. App. 3d 511, 516, 248 Cal. Rptr. 418, 423 (1988).
96. Id. See In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 128, 396 P.2d 809, 815, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393,
399 (1964). The test in Hubbard requires the court to consider whether the legislature, in
enacting a statutory scheme, has preempted local legislation by implication. Id. The test is
whether: (1) The state law so completely covers the subject that the matter has become
exclusively a state concern; (2) whether the state law is couched in such terms as to clearly
indicate that a paramount state concern will not tolerate local regulation in that area; or (3)
whether the state law is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the
transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefit to the municipality. Id.
97. western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist., 202
Cal. App. 3d 511, 521, 248 Cal. Rptr. 418, 424 (1988).
98. Id. (preemption finding necessary to effectuate legislative goals). See CAL. HEALTH &
SArTY CODE § 39650(d) (legislative goals include the utilization of the beft available scientific
evidence and scientific review in the TAC identification process).
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air contaminants might conflict with ARB determinations under
Tanner and frustrate the legislature's desire to provide for uniform
regulation of toxic air contaminants. 99 Thus, the court concluded,
Tanner preempted Rule 1000's toxic air contaminant identification
process. 00
Applied to Rule 1000, the court of appeal's holding invalidated
the identification procedures contained in Rule 1000, but not the
subsequent regulatory provisions applicable to identified toxic air
contaminants. 01 Since districts would be precluded from identifying
toxic air contaminants, any new regulatory action by districts would
be restrained until after the ARB had finished its identification
procedures mandated under Tanner.102 Once an air contaminant was
identified as toxic by the ARB, however, districts would be free to
regulate the substance.103 The California Supreme Court, in a unan-
imous decision, reversed the court of appeal.'0 4
B. The Opinion
1. Tanner's Preemption of District Regulation
In an opinion by Justice Eagleson, the supreme court examined
the statutory authority granted to districts before the passage of
Tanner. The court determined that prior to Tanner, the districts had
clear authority to regulate all nonvehicular air emissions. 05 Therefore,
Rule 1000 was valid unless Tanner repealed preexisting district au-
thority. 06 Nothing in Tanner expressly indicated an intent to preclude
a district from regulating a substance until after the ARB determined
99. Monterey Bay, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 521, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
100. Id. The court determined that conflict might result if the ARB studied a substance
and determined that it was not toxic, but the District, under Rule 1000 concluded otherwise.
Id. See Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist., 49
Cal. 3d 408, 426 n.18, 777 P.2d 157, 168 n.18, 261 Cal. Rptr. 384, 395 n.18 (1989) (the
California Supreme Court declined to resolve this potential conflict).
101. Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist., 202
Cal. App. 3d 511, 522, 248 Cal. Rptr. 418, 424 (1988).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist., 49
Cal. 3d 408, 429, 777 P.2d 157, 170, 261 Cal. Rptr. 384, 397 (1989).
105. Id. at 417, 777 P.2d at 162, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
106. Id. at 417, 777 P.2d at 162, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
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that it was toxic. °7 Contrary to the implied preemption analysis
applied by the court of appeals, however, the supreme court framed
the controlling issue as whether the passage of Tanner repealed by
implication the district's otherwise existing statutory authority. 08
Pursuant to this approach, the court reviewed judicial presumptions
relating to implied repeal.' °9
Judicial analysis of a statute requires the presumption to be against
implied repeal of existing statutes." 0 To overcome the presumption,
the two statutes must be totally irreconcilable."' The presumption
against implied repeal is especially difficult to rebut if a statute serves
an important public purpose." 2 There was no doubt that the District's
mandate, the protection of public health through the regulation of
toxic air pollutants, involved an important public purpose."' Hence,
the Monterey Bay court concluded that a finding of repeal by
implication must be supported by "undebatable evidence" of legis-
lative intent to repeal district authority." 4 Undebatable evidence of
intent to repeal may be found when there is no possibility that the
statutes will operate concurrently, or where the statute itself evidences
an intent to repeal a former grant of authority." 5
a. Concurrent Operation
In determining whether concurrent operation was possible, the
court first distinguished the regulatory function of the ARB from
that of the districts in the existing air pollution regulatory frame-
work." 6 The court noted that the ARB's regulatory authority ex-
tended primarily to vehicular sources of air pollution." 7 The districts,
on the other hand, were left with the primary responsibility for
107. Id. at 417, 777 P.2d at 162, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
108. Id. However, the court emphasized that the result did not depend on whether the
issue was characterized as preemption or implied repeal. Id.
109. Id.
110. Flores v. Workman's Comp., 11 Cal. 3d 171, 176, 520 P.2d 1033, 1038, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 217, 222 (1974).
111. Penziner v. West Am. Fin. Co., 10 Cal. 2d 160, 176, 74 P.2d 252, 368 (1937);
Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Dorff, 98 Cal. App. 3d 109, 114, 159 Cal. Rptr. 211, 216 (1979).
112. SUTHERLAMl, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.10 (4th ed. 1985).
113. Monterey Bay, 49 Cal. 3d at 419, 777 P.2d at 163, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
114. Id. at 420, 777 P.2d at 164, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 391 (quoting Hays v. Wood 25 Cal.
3d 772, 784, 603 P.2d 19, 24, 160 Cal. Rptr. 102, 107 (1979)).
115. See Penziner, 10 Cal. 2d at 176, 74 P.2d at 368.
116. Monterey Bay, 49 Cal. 3d at 420, 777 P.2d at 164, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
117. Id. See CAL. HEALT & SArFEY CODE § 40000 (West 1986) (ARB authority to regulate
vehicular emissions does not extend to nonvehicular emissions).
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regulating nonvehicular sources of air pollution.1 8 Since the ARB
and districts operated in different spheres of authority there could
be little risk of conflict. 119
Under Tanner, districts are required to implement ATCMs pro-
duced by the ARB only if their own existing regulation is less
stringent. 120 Given the slow pace at which the ARB was progressing
under Tanner, the Supreme Court recognized the need for continued
district regulation. 12 Because the existing statutory authority of dis-
tricts could operate concurrently with the authority exercised by the
ARB under Tanner, there was no basis for implied repeal.-'
b. Absence of Undebatable Evidence of Legislative Intent to
Repeal
The supreme court noted that in rare cases, the language of a state
statute may provide undebatable evidence of an intent to supercede
local authority.- 3 In reviewing Tanner for such language, the court
placed special significance on the legislature's expressed intent to
provide a regulatory system which would compliment existing au-
thority. 24 The court found it unreasonable to conclude that the
legislature intended to restrict longstanding district authority through
language expressly stating a desire to compliment local activity. 1
5
Citing other provisions of Tanner, the court noted that the ARB's
role under Tanner was to provide technical and scientific assistance
to districts in order to achieve the earliest practicable control of air
pollution. 26 Such a legislative pronouncement did not indicate an
intent to preclude district identification of toxic air contaminants
118. Monterey Bay, 49 Cal. 3d at 420, 777 P.2d at 164, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 391. Under
Tanner, districts are not required to implement ARB ATCM's unless their existing regulation
is less stringent than the ATCM. Id. Thus, the court reasoned that the potential for conflict
or duplication would be minimal; the ATCM adopted by the ARB would simply provide a
lower bound for district regulation across the state. Id.
119. See id.
120. Id. at 421, 777 P.2d at 170, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. See Hays v. wood, 25 Cal. 3d 772, 784, 603 P.2d 19, 24, 160 Cal. Rptr. 102,
107 (1979).
124. Monterey Bay, 49 Cal. 3d at 421, 777 P.2d at 164, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 391 (1989)
(quoting section 39650 subsection (i) of the California Health and Safety Code).
125. Id. "Such an interpretation violates both grammatical and common sense." Id.
126. Id. at 421, 777 P.2d at 165, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
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until after the ARB was able to provide the assistance by completing
the identification process established by Tanner.
27
Turning to WSPA's contention that independent district regulation
was inconsistent with the express purpose of minimizing inconsisten-
cies in the protection of public health across the state, the court
noted that Tanner merely required district regulations to be at least
as stringent as the ATCM's promulgated by the ARB. 25 Since districts
were free to establish their own standards, subject only to the
minimum standards set by the ARB, Tanner expressly sanctioned
regulatory inconsistencies. 29 Thus, the legislative declaration could
not indicate an intent to repeal district authority. 30 Since no other
language in Tanner indicated an intent to limit district authority, the
court found no undebatable evidence of an intent to repeal district
authority.'
Finally, as a rhetorical exercise, the court addressed the practical
effect of WSPA's interpretation of Tanner. 132 As a general rule of
statutory construction, if the language of a statute is susceptible to
more than one interpretation, the interpretation which best promotes
the legislative purpose should be adopted. 13 WSPA contended that
the legislature's expressed intent to provide for the identification of
TAC's by means of the best available scientific evidence and for the
uniform regulation of TAC's throughout the state, indicated an intent
to prevent local districts from independently identifying toxic subst-
ances. 3
4
The supreme court again focused on the expressed need to achieve
the earliest practicable control of TAC's. 35 If WSPA's construction
of Tanner were adopted, districts would be precluded from regulating
new toxic substances until after the ARB had completed its own
127. Id.
128. Id. See CAL. HEALTH & SA'ETY CODE § 39650(k) (West 1986) (legislative purpose to
minimize inconsistencies in the protection of public health).
129. western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist., 49
Cal. 3d 408, 421, 777 P.2d 157, 165, 261 Cal. Rptr. 384, 392 (1989).
130. Id.
131. Id at 422, 777 P.2d at 165, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
132. Id.
133. Id. (quoting Clements v. T.R. Bechtel Co., 43 Cal. 2d 227, 233, 273 P.2d 5, 11
(1954)). See Dyna-Med Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm., 43 Cal. 3d 1379, 1387,
743 P.2d 1323, 1327, 241 Cal. Rptr. 67, 70 (1987) (consideration should be given to the
consequences that will flow from a particular statutory interpretation).
134. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text (discussing WSPA's interpretation of
Tanner).
135. See Monterey Bay, 49 Cal. 3d at 426, 777 P.2d at 168, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
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evaluation.136 Given the presumption that the legislature was aware
of the ARB's slow progress under Tanner, the court found it unrea-
sonable to conclude that the legislature intended to repeal the long-
standing authority of districts in the interim. 137 Since the procedures
provided under Tanner could require years to complete for each
substance considered, the practical effect of precluding district reg-
ulation would seriously limit air pollution control within the state. 3
Nonvehicular sources of TAC's could emit unrestricted amounts of
substances until after the ARB had identified the substances as
toxic. 39 That result would be inconsistent with the legislature's desire
to achieve effective regulation by the earliest possible date."' 0
c. Implied Preemption of District Authority in the Absence of
ARB Identification
As a concession to the analysis and decision by the court of
appeals, the supreme court briefly addressed the issue from an implied
preemption perspective.' 4' Generally, local legislation that conflicts
with general law is void."42 A conflict arises when a local ordinance
duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area covered by general law. 143
The court of appeals emphasized Tanner's complex identification
procedure, coupled with the legislature's expressed intent to utilize
the best scientific evidence, to conclude that Tanner preempted district
identification of toxic substances. 4
The supreme court tempered the general rule with the presumption
that a long history of local regulation, coupled with a legislatively
imposed duty to protect the public health, weighs against a finding
136. Id.
137. Id. See Hays v. Wood, 25 Cal. 3d 772, 784, 603 P.2d 19, 24, 160 Cal. Rptr. 102,
107 (1979) (presumption that the legislature is aware of existing statutes and intends all
subsequent enactments to be consistent).
138. See Monterey Bay, 49 Cal. 3d, at 425, 777 P.2d at 167, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
139. Id.
140. Id. If local Districts were precluded from regulating substances in the absence of an
ARB determination of toxicity the authority to regulate nonvehicular air emissions would be
lost for all practical purposes. Id. at 412, 777 P.2d 158, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
141. Id.
142. Id. See People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, 36 Cal. 3d 476, 484, 683
P.2d 1150, 1155, 204 Cal. Rptr. 897, 902 (1984) (quoting Lancaster v. Municipal Court, 6
Cal. 3d 805, 806, 494 P.2d 681, 682, 100 Cal. Rptr. 609, 610 (1972) (conflict means duplicate,
contradict, or impinge in an area already fully occupied by state law)).
143. Lancaster v. Municipal Court, 6 Cal. 3d 805, 807, 494 P.2d 681, 682, 100 Cal. Rptr.
606, 610 (1972).
144. Id.
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of implied preemption. 145 Districts had clear authority to protect the
public health by regulating nonvehicular air pollution within their
regions. 146 Further, Tanner provides that protection of the public
health required the control of TAC's by the earliest possible date.
47
Since the legislature was presumably aware that Tanner's procedures
would take a substantial amount of time for the ARB to complete,
its failure to provide an interim procedure supported the conclusion
that the legislature did not intend to preempt district regulatory
power. 148 The complexity of the identification procedures, alone, was
insufficient to support a finding of implied preemption. 49 Further-
more, in the supreme court's view, the legislative statement requiring
that the identification of toxic air contaminants utilize the best
scientific evidence merely indicated an intent to ensure effective ARB
regulation in the future. 50 The statement did not indicate an intent
to "hamstring" district control in the interim period.'
2. Delegation of Legislative Authority
The Monterey Bay court then turned to WSPA's second contention,
that the Officer's discretion in the identification of toxic air contam-
inants and CTAC's constituted an improper exercise of rule-making
authority. 15 2 The court dismissed the improper delegation issue as
premature on the ground that the Officer's initial list of 125 sub-
stances was attached to Rule 1000 when it was enacted.'53 As a
general rule, an agency's subsequent approval or ratification of an
act delegated to a subordinate validates the act and the act becomes
an act of the agency.'5 4 Because the Officer's initial list of substances
was attached to Rule 1000 when it was enacted by the pollution
145. See Monterey Bay, 49 Cal. 3d at 424, 777 P.2d at 166, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 393 (1989).
See People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, 36 Cal. 3d 476, 484, 683 P.2d 1150,
1155, 204 Cal. Rptr. 897, 902 (1984).
146. See supra notes 19o33 and accompanying text (discussing district authority).
147. See CAL. HALT & SAFETY CoDE § 39650(k).
148. See Monterey Bay, 49 Cal. 3d at 424, 777 P.2d at 166, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
149. Id.
150. Id. (referencing section 39650, subdivision (d) of the California Health and Safety
Code).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 427, 777 P.2d at 168, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
153. Id. at 427, 777 P.2d at 169, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
154. Id. at 428, 777 P.2d at 168, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 395 (quoting California School
Employees Ass'n v. Personnel Comm., 3 Cal. 3d 139, 145, 474 P.2d 436, 439, 89 Cal. Rptr.
620, 623 (1970)).
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control board, the Officer's list of identified toxic air contaminants
had been ratified by the pollution control board. Thus, there had
been no exercise of rule-making authority.
By limiting its decision to the initial list of identified contaminants
adopted by the pollution control board, the supreme court left open
the issue of whether future identification of toxic air contaminants
by the Officer would comport with the proper exercise of rule-making
authority. 5 . Justice Eagleson suggested that any future due process
challenge might be obviated if the District simply provided for public
notice and hearing in Rule 1000's toxic air contaminant identification
process, or that the Board simply ratify identified substances as an
amendment to the existing list." 6
III. LEGAL RAMICATIONS
The Tanner Act's comprehensive identification process was enacted
to promote uniformity and scientific integrity in the regulation of
toxic air pollutants within the state. 15 7 Because of the difficulties
presented by independent district regulation, the ARB's assistance
was deemed necessary to achieve such regulation by the earliest
practicable date. 58 Measured by these standards, Tanner has been a
failure. The ARB has managed to identify only nine substances as
TAC's since Tanner was enacted and no ATCM's have been adopted.
59
Since the ATCM is the only standard actually imposed upon districts
under Tanner, the ARB's inability to produce an ATCM in nine
years underscores Tanner's ineffectiveness.160 Additionally, Tanner's
silence concerning the continuing authority of the districts may have
discouraged districts from refining their own regulatory programs
155. See infra notes 166-67 and accompanying text (discussing the need for compliance
with rule-making formalities).
156. See Monterey Bay, 49 Cal. 3d at 428, 777 P.2d at 169, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
157. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39650(k) (West 1986).
158. Id. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the practical difficulties
associated with independent district management of air pollution).
159. The ineffectiveness of the ARB's performance under Tanner is illustrated by the fact
that methyl isocyanate, a substance accidentally released by a subsidiary of Union Carbide
operating in Bhopal India in 1984 and which killed more than 2500 people, has not been
identified as a TAC. Amicus Curiae Brief at 6, Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Monterey Bay
Unified Air Pollution Control Dist., 202 Cal. App. 3d 511, 248 Cal. Rptr. 418 (No. S006708)
(1988).
160. See Monterey Bay, 202 Cal. App. 3d 511, 516, 248 Cal. Rptr. 418, 421 (1988)
(discussing the effect of ATCM's adopted by the ARB).
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while they waited for ARB action.' 6' As a result, the Supreme Court's
decision in Monterey Bay, recognizing the primary responsibility of
the districts for the control of nonvehicular sources of air pollution,
as well as their authority to identify toxic air pollutants, was necessary
to preserve the pre-Tanner air pollution regulatory structure managed
by the districts.
1 62
The Monterey Bay court expressly reserved the issue of whether a
substance may be regulated by a district if the ARB makes a final
determination that the substance is not toxic. 63 Clearly, the possibility
for conflict exists where a district decides that a substance is toxic
and the ARB declares that it is not toxic. Under existing law, districts
can regulate any noxious substance emitted from nonvehicular sources,
whether technically toxic or not. 64 The supreme court's decision,
recognizing the districts' primary responsibility with respect to non-
vehicular sources, would indicate that districts may regulate contrary
to the ARB finding. If such regulation is possible, an argument could
be made that the value of the ARB's careful study of toxic air
contaminants, mandated under Tanner, would be reduced.'65
Districts seeking to implement a regulation like Rule 1000 should
take special care to comply with statutory rule-making requirements.
In declining to decide the delegation of authority issue, the Monterey
Bay court leaves the door open for future litigation on the point.
161. See Monterey Bay, 49 Cal. 3d at 418 n.14, 777 P.2d at 163 n.14, 261 Cal. Rptr. at
390 n.14 (1989). (Rule 1000, adopted three years after the enactment of Tanner, was the first
toxic air contaminant identification program enacted by a district).
162. See Monterey Bay, 49 Cal. 3d at 412, 777 P.2d at 158, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 385 (court
of appeal's construction, finding implied preemption of district identification programs, would
seriously hamper air pollution control in California).
163. See id. at 426 n.18, 777 P.2d at 168 n.18, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 395 n.18 (the California
Supreme Court declined to resolve this potential conflict).
164. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 41700 (West 1986) (prohibits discharge of any
air contaminant); 39013 (West 1986) (air contaminant defined); 42450, 42451 (district authority
to issue order of abatement for discharge of air contaminant).
165. Presumably, the careful study of potential TAC's conducted by the ARB is intended
to protect business from inefficient regulation of harmless air emissions as much as to identify
toxic substances. In any case, if districts are not bound by the ARB's TAC identification
process, as it progresses, the resulting ad hoc regulatory system would appear much as it did
prior to Tanner. As a result, the legislative purpose to minimize inconsistencies in the protection
of public health across the state may not be served. See Brief for Respondent at 17, Western
Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist., 49 Cal. 3d 408, 777
P.2d 157, 261 Cal. Rptr. 388 (No. S006708) (1989) (discussing WSPA's argument concerning
the need for utilizing the "best scientific evidence"). The counter argument is that the ARB's
determination under Tanner, made with consideration of statewide application, should be more
conservative than a local district regulation, which, in any case, may be more stringent than
standards proposed by the ARB. Such a system defers to local control and allows regulatory
flexibility necessary to meet local needs.
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Where an Officer adds new substances to the list of identified toxic
air pollutants, a plaintiff could argue that the amendment requires
public notice and a hearing in order to comply with statutory rule-
making requirements.' 66 In order to avoid such a challenge, the
supreme court noted that a district can simply provide for public
notice and hearing in the identification process, or, as in this case,
the Board can ratify the new substances added by the air pollution
control officer. 167
Until the legislature revises or replaces Tanner, districts should
take the initiative and enact procedures similar to Rule 1000. Without
aggressive action at the district level, pollution problems can only
get worse. It is clear that Tanner will not contribute much to achieve
its stated goals in the foreseeable future. 6s
IV. CONCLUSION
Effective control of nonvehicular sources of air pollution by in-
dependent districts is limited by economic and political constraints.
1 69
In enacting Tanner, the legislature responded to a need for minimum
regulation of toxic air contaminants throughout the state and for
more careful scientific evaluation of potentially toxic air pollutants.
1 70
Tanner's comprehensive toxic air contaminant identification proce-
dures, administered by the ARB, did not address whether districts
retained authority to identify toxic air contaminants for purposes of
regulation.17' The ARB's slow progress under Tanner left a regulatory
void and created a need to resolve the issue of whether districts
retained authority to identify toxic substances.
72
In Monterey Bay, the California Supreme Court held that the
legislature, in enacting Tanner, did not intend to repeal the statutory
authority of districts to regulate all nonvehicular sources of air
166. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11342(b) (West 1987) (definition of regulation includes any
rule, regulation, or standard of general application adopted by an agency). Hence, the
identification of a substance as toxic, and the consequent imposition of regulatory standards,
is an exercise of rule-making authority. Id. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 40725-28
(Vest Supp. 1989) (describing rule-making requirements, public notice and hearing require-
ments, and other necessary formalities).
167. See Monterey Bay, 49 Cal. 3d at 412, 777 P.2d at 169, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
168. See id. at 412, 777 P.2d at 169, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 395 (many years of study are
required before any significant number of substances will have been identified under Tanner).
169. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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pollution. 173 Districts may adopt procedures designed to identify toxic
air pollutants independent of the ARB acting under Tanner. 74 The
court found that the legislature intended Tanner to compliment the
existing air pollution regulatory structure, rather than to provide a
new source of direct regulation of nonvehicular air pollution sources. 7
The ARB merely studies potentially toxic substances in detail and
develops minimum standards for regulating toxic air pollutants by
districts throughout the state. 76 In light of the ARB's slow progress,
a contrary holding would have severely hampered the already limited
ability of air pollution control districts to respond to the growing air
pollution problem in the state.177
Jonathan Christianson
173. See supra notes 105-51 and accompanying t6xt.
174. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
